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Abstract
With the broad use of face recognition, its weakness
gradually emerges that it is able to be attacked. So, it is
important to study how face recognition networks are sub-
ject to attacks. In this paper, we focus on a novel way to
do attacks against face recognition network that misleads
the network to identify someone as the target person not
misclassify inconspicuously. Simultaneously, for this pur-
pose, we introduce a specific attentional adversarial attack
generative network (A3GN ) to generate fake face images.
For capturing the semantic information of the target person,
this work adds a conditional variational autoencoder and
attention modules to learn the instance-level correspon-
dences between faces. Unlike traditional two-player GAN,
this work introduces face recognition networks as the third
player to participate in the competition between generator
and discriminator which allows the attacker to impersonate
the target person better. The generated faces which are hard
to arouse the notice of onlookers can evade recognition by
state-of-the-art networks and most of them are recognized
as the target person.
1. Introduction
Neural network is widely used in different tasks in so-
ciety which is profoundly changing our life. Good algo-
rithm, adequate training data, and computing power make
neural network supersede human in many tasks, such as
face recognition. Face recognition can be used to determine
which one the face images belong to or whether the two face
images belong to the same one. Applications based on this
technology are gradually adopted in some important tasks,
such as identity authentication in a railway station and for
payment. Unfortunately, it has been shown that face recog-
nition network can be deceived inconspicuously by mildly
changing inputs maliciously. The changed inputs are named
adversarial examples which implement adversarial attacks
on networks.
Target A
Target 
Target B
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Original Generated Original Generated
Figure 1. Adversarial attack results in our work. The first column
is the target face. The 2nd and 4th columns are the original im-
ages and the rest are the generated images. Given target images,
our work is to generate images similar to the original faces but
classified as the target person.
Szegedy et al. [42] present that adversarial attacks can
be implemented by applying an imperceptible perturbation
which is hard to be observed for human eyes for the first
time. Following the work of Szegedy, many works focus on
how to craft adversarial examples to attack neural networks.
Neural network is gradually under suspicion. The works on
adversarial attacks can promote the development of neural
network. Akhtar et al. [1] review these works’ contributions
in the real-world scenarios. Illuminated by predecessor’s
works, we also do some research about adversarial attack.
Most of adversarial attacks aim at misleading classifier
to a false label, not a determined specific label. Besides,
attacks on image classifier can not be against face recog-
nition networks. Existing works produce perturbation on
the images [13, 42, 28], do some makeup to faces and add
eyeglass, hat or occlusions [34, 33, 14] to faces. And their
adversarial examples are fixed by the algorithms which are
not flexible for attacks. These algorithms can not accept any
images as inputs. Our goal is to generate face images which
are similar to the original images but can be classified as
the target person shown in Fig. 1. The method manipulat-
ing the intensity of input images directly is intensity-based.
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Our work uses geometry-based method to generate adver-
sarial examples. In our work, we use generative adversarial
net (GAN) [12] to produce adversarial examples which are
not limited by data, algorithms or target networks. It can
accept any faces as inputs and convert them to adversarial
examples for attacks. To generate adversarial examples, we
present A3GN to produce the fake image whose appear-
ance is similar to the origin but is able to be classified as the
target person.
In face verification domain, whether the two faces be-
long to one person is based on the cosine distance between
feature map in the last layer not based on the probability
for each category. So A3GN pays more attention to the
exploration of feature distribution for faces. To get the in-
stance information, we introduce a conditional variational
autoencoder to get the latent code from the target face,
and meanwhile, attentional modules are provided to capture
more feature representation and facial dependencies of the
target face. For adversarial examples, A3GN adopts two
discriminators – one for estimating whether the generated
faces are real called normal discriminator, another for esti-
mating whether the generated faces can be classified as the
target person called instance discriminator. Meanwhile, co-
sine loss is introduced to promise that the fake images can
be classified as the target person by the target model. Our
main contributions can be summarized into three-fold:
• We focus on a novel way of attacking against state-of-
the-art face recognition networks. They will be misled
to identify someone as the target person not misclas-
sify inconspicuously in face verification according to
the feature map not the probability.
• GAN is introduced to generate the adversarial exam-
ples different from traditional intensity-based attacks.
Meanwhile, this work presents a new GAN named
A3GN to generate adversarial examples which are
similar to the origins but have the same feature rep-
resentation as the target face.
• Good performance of A3GN can be shown by a set
of evaluation criteria in physical likeness, similarity
score, and accuracy of recognition.
2. Related work
2.1. Face recognition
We witness the great development and success of con-
volutional neural network in face recognition so far. With
the development of advanced architectures and discrimi-
native learning approaches, face recognition performance
has been boosted to an unprecedented level. Face recogni-
tion can be categorized as face verification and face iden-
tification. In our work, we focus on face verification
which determines whether a pair of faces belong to the
same person and the latter classifies a face to a specific
identity. Learning discriminative deep face representation
through large-scale face identity classification was proposed
by [43, 44, 39, 38, 40, 37]. More and more CNN-based ap-
proaches are absorbed in loss functions [25, 46, 8, 48, 41].
Our goal is to generate adversarial examples with A3GN
to attack these state-of-the-art face recognition networks in
face verification.
2.2. Adversarial attack
With the remarkable accuracy, neural network gets ac-
cess to many important domains in society, such as self-
driving cars, surveillance and identity authentication. The
security problem of neural networks has become a crit-
ical problem. Szegedy et al. [42] reveal the perturba-
tion which can fool DNN for the first time. Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. [29] demonstrate that ‘universal perturba-
tion’ can fool the classifier by any image in most type of
models. I.J.Goodfellow et al. [13] present that the intrin-
sic reason for adversarial attack is the linearity and high-
dimensions of inputs. Su et al. [36] present a method to
generate one-pixel adversarial perturbations to attack mod-
els using differential evolution in an extremely specific sce-
nario. In the face recognition domain, Bose et al. [3]
craft adversarial examples by solving constrained optimiza-
tion so that face detector can not detect faces. Sharif et
al. [33] propose a method focusing on facial biometric sys-
tems which can be widely used in surveillance and access
control. Many works are proposed to explore more imper-
ceptible adversarial examples to attack neural networks ef-
ficiently [23, 10, 4, 20, 30, 27].
In this paper, we focus on generating quasi-
imperceptible adversarial examples to do white-box
and targeted attacks.
2.3. Generative adversarial network
Generative adversarial networks [12] have achieved
great performance and impressive results in image gener-
ation [31, 9], style transfer [45, 22, 11], image-to-image
translation [21, 52, 53] and representation learning [31,
32, 26]. Most works utilize conditional variables such
as attributes [50, 6]. CycleGAN [52] preserves key at-
tributes between the input and the translated images by a
cycle consistency loss which has received a good improve-
ment in unpaired image-to-image translation. Conditional
VAEs [35] have shown the good performance for image-
to-image translation which learn a mapping from input to
output image. In [53], cVAE-GAN and cLR-GAN are used
to learn a low-dimensional latent code and then map from
a high-dimensional input to a high-dimensional output. In
our work, we use conditional variational autoencoder GAN
to learn the feature representation of the target person for
generating adversarial examples from any faces to attack
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face recognition networks.
3. Attentional Adversarial Attack Generative
Network
3.1. Threat model
In our work, the adversary aims at fooling a face recog-
nition network to recognize someone to another one which
belongs to impersonation(targeted) attack. To achieve this
purpose, we consider a white-box attack with the access of
face recognition networks which has knowledge of the out-
puts, parameters, architectures, training data of target net-
works. Simultaneously, we also consider a black-box attack
to test our A3GN transferability. We adopt state-of-the-art
face recognition networks as target models. Different net-
works learn different feature representations for face images
which will prove thatA3GN can be applied to attack differ-
ent networks. Our adversarial goal is to generate adversarial
images which are similar to the original images from LFW
datasets but recognized as the target person by imitating fea-
ture representation of the target person from target models.
For this goal, we present A3GN for generating adversarial
examples.
3.2. A3GN
We adopt conditional variational autoencoder generative
adversarial networks which can learn targeted feature for
generating adversarial examples to fool the target network.
To guarantee that generated images are classified as the
target person better, we introduce some attentional blocks
into conditional variational autoencoder GAN to constitute
A3GN shown in Fig. 2.
Conditional variational autoencoder GAN. For exploring
the feature distribution of different faces, we use cVAE-
GAN to capture the instance information of different faces
for the generator to produce the adversarial examples.
Given a target image y, using an encoding function E
learns a latent code z of y, E(y) → z. Generator G1
combines z and an input image x to synthesize the output
xˆ, G1(x, z) → xˆ. Normal discriminator D1 determines
whether xˆ is real or not. To make the generated images in-
distinguishable from real images, we adopt an adversarial
loss:
Ladv = Ex[logD1(x)] + Ex,z[log(1−D1(G1(x, z)], (1)
where generated image G1(x, z) learns the latent code z
from the target image y, while normal discriminator D1
tries to distinguish G1(x, z) between real and fake image.
Normal discriminator D1 tries to maximize D1(x) which is
opposite to the generator G1.
For the stability of training and high quality generated
images, we replace Eq. 1 with Wasserstein GAN objective
with gradient penalty [2] [15]:
Ladv = Ex[logD1(x)]− Ex,z[D1(G1(x, z))]
−λgpEx′ [(‖∇x′D1(x′)‖2 − 1)2],
(2)
where x′ is sampled between a pair of a real and a generated
images. And λgp is set to 10.
To preserve the content of the input images while chang-
ing instance-level information and a part of feature repre-
sentation of the inputs, we introduce a cycle-consistency
loss [52] to the generator as reconstruction loss:
Lrec = Ex,z[‖x−G2(G1(x, z))‖1], (3)
whereG2 is used to take in the generated imageG1(x, z) as
input and reconstruct the original image x. The reconstruct
loss adopts the `1 norm. Here, G1 and G2 are two different
generators with inputs of different dimensions.
Instance discriminator. In this work, we propose an in-
stance discriminator D2 as third-player to participate in the
competition which brings about impersonating target faces
better. For generating images with the similar feature rep-
resentation to the target image, we adopt face recognition
network as the instance discriminator directly. For a given
input image x, and a latent code z from the target image y,
E(y) → z, our goal is to translate x into xˆ, G1(x, z) → xˆ,
which can be classified as y by D2. To achieve this condi-
tion, we adopt a cosine loss, defined as:
Lcos = 1− SIM(y,G1(x, z)) = 1− cos θ
= 1− Ex,y,z[
D2(y) ·D2(G1(x, z))
‖D2(y)‖ · ‖D2(G1(x, z))‖],
(4)
where D2 is the instance discriminator, and D2(y) and
D2(G1(x, z)) mean the feature representation of y and
G1(x, z). Minimizing cosine loss can minimize the differ-
ence between generated image G1(x, z) and target image y
in space which brings benefit to generating adversarial ex-
amples. The objective functions are defined as,
LD1 = −Ladv, (5)
LG = Ladv + λrecLrec + λcosLcos, (6)
where λrec and λcos are hyper-parameters that control the
relative importance of reconstruction loss and cosine loss
respectively compared to the adversarial loss. In our work,
we use λrec = 10 and λcos = 10.
Instance-level attentional block. During the feature ex-
tracting and example generating, we plug geometric atten-
tional blocks into VAE to constitute attentional variational
autoencoder. In addition, we adopt channel-wise atten-
tional blocks into the generator to model interdependen-
cies between the channel to capture feature representation
of faces named attentional generator.
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latent code z
Target or not?
Real or not?
Attentional Generator
Instance 
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Figure 2. Overview of A3GN . Attentional variational autoencoder (AVAE) captures the latent code z from target face y. And then the
original face x is concatenated with z to generate xˆ, G(x, z) → xˆ in attentional generator. G(x, z) is sent into normal discriminator to
determine whether it is a real image or not with x and sent into instance discriminator to determine whether it can be classified as the target
person or not with y.
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Figure 3. Overview of the geometric attentional block in varia-
tional autoencoder. Basic block is a basic residual block in vari-
ational autoencoder. ⊕ means element-wise sum and ⊗ means
matrix multiplication.
The overview of an attentional block in VAE is shown in
...
sq&ex
scale
...
G(x,z)zx
Figure 4. Overview of a channel-wise attentional block in the gen-
erator. “sq&ex” is the squeeze operation (global average pooling)
and the excitation operation (gating mechanism with a sigmoid
activation). “scale” is the operation to rescale the transformation
output with activations after squeeze and excitation to get the chan-
nels with different weights of importance.
Fig. 3. VAE in our work is to learn the feature representa-
tion of the target person whose facial dependency is signif-
icant for capturing the latent code. It is related to the self-
attention method which computes the response at one point
in a sequence such facial feature by attending to all points.
For this purpose, we introduce non-local block [47] to cap-
ture the facial dependency. For instance-level learning, we
combine basic variational autoencoder residual block and
non-local to propose attentional VAE (AVAE) in our A3GN
in Fig. 3. As shown in Fig. 2, attentional VAE can encode
the geometric information of target face and learn the facial
dependency from different parts of human face effectively.
We concatenate the original face x (3-dimension) with
the latent code z (7-dimension) as the input of attentional
generator in Fig. 4. After two subsampling convolution lay-
ers in the generator, we introduce squeeze-and-excitation
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operations [18] to emphasize informative features and sup-
press less useful ones in channel. SE operations propose to
squeeze global spatial information into a channel descriptor
by using global average pooling to generate channel-wise
statistic. In excitation operation, a gating mechanism with a
sigmoid activation is employed to capture channel-wise de-
pendencies. Finally, we employ scaling to rescale the trans-
formation output. Owing to squeeze-and-excitation, we can
maintain informative features from the latent code more and
suppress the useless information in channels which con-
tributes to capturing feature representation of the target per-
son.
4. Experiments
4.1. Evaluation
In our work, we define a set of specific evaluation criteria
to measure the effectiveness of the attacks:
• Real accuracy & Fake accuracy & mAP. It is de-
fined as the percentage of adversarial examples which
are successfully classified as the target person by target
model. When cosine distance between examples and
target faces is more than 0.45, we consider examples
as target faces with a true predicting label. Real ac-
curacy shows the percentage of original images which
can be classified as the target person, which is usually
0%, while fake accuracy shows the percentage of gen-
erated images which can be classified as the target per-
son. mAP is the mean average precision with different
thresholds in a range from 0 to 1 whose step is 0.01.
• Similarity score. Cosine distance between original
faces/generated faces and target face faces is seen as
a similarity score. Cosine distance is a significant met-
ric in face recognition for verifying whether the two
images belong to one person. In our results, we show
the similarity scores before attack and after attack and
improvement (∆) of similarity scores to exhibit the ef-
fectiveness ofA3GN for attacks. Meanwhile, the sim-
ilarity scores between the real image and the fake im-
age exhibit the ability that the generated images can
be recognized as their real identities by face recogni-
tion networks. The similarity scores between the real
image and the fake image are less, the attack is more
successful.
• SSIM. SSIM means the percentage of structural sim-
ilarity index between original faces and generating
faces higher than a threshold. SSIM is a quantiza-
tion criterion to determine whether generating faces
are perturbed slightly compared with original faces. In
our work, we set 0.9 as the threshold to evaluate the
quality of generated images compared to original im-
ages.
4.2. Datasets
The state-of-the-art face recognition networks are trained
in CASIA-WebFace dataset and refined MS-Celeb-1M [8].
Meanwhile, ourA3GN is also trained on CASIA-WebFace.
And in the inference time, we perform A3GN on LFW by
generating adversarial examples paired with target faces to
verify whether they belong to one person.
CASIA-WebFace. CASIA-WebFace dataset [51] is a web-
collected dataset which has 494,414 face images belong-
ing to 10,575 different individuals. In our experiments, we
use aligned CASIA-WebFace which has images with size
of 112×112 after alignment.
MS-Celeb-1M. The original MS-Celeb-1M dataset [16]
contains about 100k identities with 10 million images. In
[8], the noise of MS-Celeb-1M is decreased, and finally, re-
fined MS-Celeb-1M contains 3.8M images of 85k unique
identities.
LFW. LFW dataset [19] contains 13, 233 web-collected im-
ages from 5749 different identities, with large variations
in pose, expression and illuminations. In face verification,
the verification accuracy is usually measured on 6000 face
pairs. But in our work, we pair all the images in LFW with
target face image.
4.3. A3GN with Attentional Block
In this section, we do some experiments to verify the
feasibility and effectiveness of attentional blocks. We train
A3GN on CASIA-WebFace and utilize it to generate adver-
sarial examples on LFW to attack target model in the infer-
ence time. We employ ArcFace [8] which has an accuracy
of 99.42% on LFW as the target model in these experiments.
Network architecture. We design A3GN based on cVAE-
GAN. For the encoder, we use a classifier with 4 residual
basic blocks for the latent code with 7 dimensions. Adapted
from [6] [52], generator in our work is composed of two
convolution layers for downsampling, 6 residual blocks, and
two convolution layers for upsampling. In the generator, we
use instance normalization which are not used in discrimi-
nator. In our work, we have two discriminators. One is the
target face recognition network for classifying whether the
image patches belong to the target person or not called in-
stance discriminator and another is PatchGAN discrimina-
tor [21] for classifying whether the image patched are real
or not called normal discriminator.
Training details. In the training process, the target per-
son contains 7 different face images for capturing the la-
tent code. All the input images are resized and cropped to
112×112. Because our goal is to generate images for fool-
ing the face recognition network, all the images should do
the alignment similar to the operation in face verification.
We update generator once by LG after five normal discrim-
inator updates and one generator update by Lcos while the
instance discriminator is fixed all the time. All the models
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are trained for 200000 iterations and use Adam [24] with
β1 = 0.5 and β2 = 0.999. The batch size is set to 32 in all
experiments. We set the learning rate to 0.0001 for the first
100000 iterations and linearly decay the learning rate to 0
over the next 100000 iterations.
Quantitative evaluation. We perform a quantitative analy-
sis of the mAP, the difference of similarity score and SSIM
on our baseline. All the results are calculated on average
among 5 target faces to eliminate the occasionality. The
performance of baseline is shown in Table 1. We design
two groups of experiments with different conditions to ver-
ify the effectiveness of A3GN . One is to encode image A
to attack image A. Another is to encode image A to attack
image A′. Neither of A and A′ is in target images datasets
for the latent code in the training process. In the experiment
of baseline, we choose one target person randomly to test
the performance. The threshold of cosine distance for fake
accuracy is set to 0.45. The experiment in A → A can get
higher accuracy than the experiment in A → A′ because it
can learn the feature representation of A in the encoder for
attacking A. As shown in the Table 1, our baseline can fool
the target model generally. Most of them can be classified
as the target person in the threshold of 0.45. SSIM is a cri-
terion to evaluate the quality of generated images in some
similar works. But we think it does not a strict criterion
to evaluate the similarity between the generated images and
the original images for human eyes.
We notice that the accuracy and mAP are not extremely
high. For improving the performance, we consider intro-
ducing some attentional blocks to learn more feature rep-
resentation of the target person. For capturing the facial
dependencies of the target person, we introduce geometric
attentional blocks, non-local blocks, into the encoder to im-
prove the performance. And the performance is shown in
Table 2. Obviously, each criterion gets improvement com-
pared with the baseline. It is effective to capture the facial
dependencies for encoding the latent code.
The geometric attention in encoder can capture the
instance-level information effectively. We conjecture that
introducing attentional blocks in the generator may also get
better performance. During the process of generating im-
ages, the generator forces the fake images more similar to
the original images which results in the loss of feature rep-
resentation of the target person due to Lrec. Thus, we con-
sider introducing channel-wise attentional blocks into the
generator to focus on the information of the latent code.
The performance is shown in Table 3. It exceeds our ex-
pectations to outperform the experiment of geometric atten-
tional blocks by 1.95% of mAP in A → A condition. We
conjecture that channel-wise attentional blocks maintain the
instance information from the latent code primarily.
Following the two aforementioned experiments of atten-
tional blocks, we combine geometric attention and channel-
Fake acc.(%) mAP(%) similarity score(∆) SSIM(%)
A→ A 97.52 53.74 0.506 3.466
A→ A′ 93.82 51.72 0.490 3.57
Table 1. Performance of baseline with two conditions.
Fake acc.(%) mAP(%) similarity score(∆) SSIM(%)
A→ A 98.92 54.62 0.517 3.389
A→ A′ 95.08 52.53 0.500 3.69
Table 2. Performance of geometric attention with two conditions.
Fake acc.(%) mAP(%) similarity score(∆) SSIM(%)
A→ A 99.67 56.57 0.533 4.609
A→ A′ 98.96 55.14 0.523 4.48
Table 3. Performance of channel-wise attention with two condi-
tions.
wise attention to improve the performance. The ablation
study results are shown in Table 4. And the curves of accu-
racies in A → A are shown in Fig. 5. As we can see, most
of the generated images can get more than 0.4 of cosine
distance which far surpasses the result between real images
and the target image. A3GN can fool the face recognition
network successfully.
Qualitative evaluation. In addition to the quantitative eval-
uation, we exhibit the effectiveness of 4 different models by
showing the qualitative comparison results in Fig. 6. All
the generated images in Fig. 6 can be classified as the target
person in the threshold of 0.45 and they are similar to the
original images just with quasi-imperceptible perturbation.
We observe that our model can provide a higher visual qual-
ity of attack results on LFW even in baseline. However, the
generated images are similar to the target image in physical
likeness slightly such as the nose and eyes. We conjecture
that it is because that the generator hammers at making the
cosine distance between generated images and target image
higher. It shows that face recognition network recognizes
people by focusing on their noses and eyes more, and the
contours of their faces and mouths less.
Furthermore, we choose 5 different target face images to
exhibit the results of attacks in Fig. 7. Most of the generated
images are prone to the target face image slightly. It would
seem that most face recognition network focuses on recog-
nizing people by their facial feature and a slight change on
the facial feature can fool the face recognition network to
recognize as another person which is imperceptible for ob-
servers. Meanwhile, a mask learned from the target person
can also fool the network.
White-box attack. In white-box scenario, we choose 3
different state-of-the-art face recognition networks to ver-
ify the feasibility of our model A3GN in different target
networks. The performance on different target models in
white-box scenario is shown in Table 5. In white-box sce-
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model
Attack acc. on LFW(%) similarity score
SSIM(%)Real
acc.
Fake
acc.
mAP Before
A3GN
After
A3GN
Between
R&F
A→ A
Baseline 0.0 97.52 53.74 0.026 0.532(0.506) 0.163 3.466
Geometric attention 0.0 98.12 54.62 0.026 0.543(0.517) 0.161 3.389
Channel-wise attention 0.0 99.66 56.27 0.026 0.558(0.532) 0.146 4.609
Both 0.0 99.59 56.28 0.026 0.559(0.533) 0.161 5.194
A→ A′
Baseline 0.0 93.82 51.72 0.022 0.512(0.490) 0.163 3.57
Geometric attention 0.0 95.08 52.53 0.022 0.523(0.500) 0.162 3.69
Channel-wise attention 0.0 98.96 54.99 0.022 0.545(0.523) 0.146 4.48
Both 0.0 98.92 55.14 0.022 0.546(0.525) 0.160 5.16
Table 4. Ablation study of 4 different models for A3GN . Baseline: Conditional GAN baseline. Geometric attention: Conditional GAN
with geometric attentional blocks. Channel-wise attention: Conditional GAN with channel-wise attentional blocks. Both: Conditional
GAN with geometric attentional and channel-wise attentional blocks. The threshold of cosine distance is set to 0.45.
Figure 5. Accuracy curve in different thresholds. The horizontal
axis represents the different thresholds and the vertical axis rep-
resents the accuracy in different thresholds. GA means geometric
attention. CWA means channel-wise attention.
nario, the parameters, architectures and the feature space of
target models are obtained in the training process. Thus, the
generator can generate images directionally. The metrics of
evaluation in this section are mAP, the difference of similar-
ity score, the similarity score between real images and fake
images and SSIM. And in Table 5, we show the accuracy
of the target network on LFW in face verification. mAP
and the difference of similarity score indicate the ability to
fool the networks to recognize as the target person and the
similarity score between real images and fake images can
indicate the ability to fool the networks to be mistaken. All
of them can prove that our model A3GN can be applied to
fool different state-of-the-art networks.
In the experiment on attacking ResNet with softmax and
Sphereface, mAPs are lower than that in the experiment on
attacking ArcFace. But the attack on Sphereface is more ef-
Baseline
Geometric
attention
Channel-wise
attention
Both
Original
images
Figure 6. Generated images by A3GN with 4 different models.
The first row is the original images and the rest is the generated
images by A3GN with 4 different models. The target person is
Target A in Fig. 7.
target model acc. on LFW(%) mAP(%)
similarity score
SSIM(%)
∆ R&F
Softmax 97.02 45.32 0.421 0.232 5.521
Sphereface [46] 99.20 49.04 0.478 0.090 6.440
ArcFace [8] 99.42 56.26 0.530 0.161 5.025
Table 5. A3GN performance on different target models in white-
box scenario.
fective in reducing the similarity score between real images
and fake images. And we conjecture that different training
data and different accuracy on LFW result in the different
performance on generated images. For ResNet with soft-
max and Sphereface, the training data is CASIA-WebFace.
But for ArcFace, the training data is MS-Celeb-1M. Dif-
ferent training data bring about different feature representa-
tion.
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Target A
Target B
Target C
Target D
Target E
Figure 7. Generated images by A3GN for 5 target faces. The left is original image and the right is generated image.
target model acc. on LFW(%) mAP(%)
similarity score
∆ R&F
Softmax 97.02 17.70 0.082 0.58
Sphereface [25] 99.20 12.32 0.110 0.59
MobileFaceNet [5] 99.18 9.07 0.297 0.41
Table 6. A3GN performance on different target models in black-
box scenario.
Black-box attack. In this section, we explore whether fool-
ing one face recognition network leads to successful fooling
other networks. In black-box scenario, the parameters, ar-
chitectures and the feature space of target models are not ob-
tained in the training process. The instance discriminator in
black-box scenario is only ArcFace [8] in this experiment.
And we have no access of target networks, ResNet [17]
with softmax, Sphereface [25] and MobileFaceNet [5] in
the training process. In the inference time, we just obtain
the feature map of images from the last layers to test the
performance. The performance on different target networks
in black-box scenario is shown in Table 6. Obviously, each
result in Table 6 is lower than that in Table 5. But we also
observe that the generated images can disturb the target net-
works slightly. Black-box attack will be a future work to
explore and study.
Comparison with previous works. We compare our
A3GN with previous attack models in face recognition on
CASIA-WebFace dataset. Because they focus on fool the
classifier to a false label, we compare our performance on
this way in Table 7. If the cosine distance between the orig-
inal image and the generated image is lower than 0.45, it
model SR(%) Attack acc. on CASIA(%)
stAdv [49] 99.18 -
GFLM [7] 99.96 -
A3GN 99.94 98.23
Table 7. Comparison with other attack models in face recognition.
‘SR’ means the success rate of fooling the network to a false label.
‘Attack acc. on CASIA’ means the accuracy of fooling the network
to a target label.
is seen as a success for an attack. As we can see, the suc-
cess rate of fool the face recognition network to a false label
for A3GN is 99.94%. It almost fools the network totally.
Though it is 0.02% lower than GFLM,A3GN can force the
target model to recognize as the target person well.
5. Conclusion
Face recognition is a compelling task in deep learning.
It is necessary to learn how face recognition networks are
subject to attacks. In this paper, we focus on a novel way
of attacking target models by fooling them to a specific la-
bel. For this purpose, we present A3GN to generate ad-
versarial examples similar to the original images but which
can be classified as the target person. To learn the feature
representation of target images, we introduce geometric at-
tention and channel-wise attention into A3GN to get good
performance. Finally, we show the results of experiments
on different target faces, white-box attack, and black-box
attack. However, our model is limited to attacking one tar-
get person. It will be a future work that one model can
attack different target faces.
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